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I. Introduction
Americans are a continental people. Some nations can be classed as
maritime, some as insular, others as border lands or buffer states. Examples
fitting all of these classifications can be found among the United States,
but overall it is the land-mass that dominates our self-perception. It 1S
the theme of this paper that the manner in which that land mass was occupied
has left an indelible imprint upon the economy, its Institutions, and the
value systems that cement the social fabric.
It was settled quickly. That is the most important point. Some
Individuals born before the Lewis and Clark expedition set out from St. LOUIS
m 1804 were still alive in 1893 when Frederick Jackson Turner proclaimed the
closing of the frontier. The scope of the enterprise was gigantic, but
the scale of the units in which settlement was accomplished was largely deter-
mined by the labor force of the family. In miles the distances were great,
and in acre-units the farms were large by old-world standards. With the
exception of the cotton South and parts of California, the task was accomplished
with decision-units that seldom exceeded the family scale.
These twin dimensions of speed and scale provide the key units in which
we can analyze the impact of an abundance of land upon the course of American
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a few of the major trends. We can begin with the manner in which the
was surveyed.
II. The Creation of a National Market ——
Initial plans for the disposition of the public lands assumed that
would be settled In large blocks, with settlement companies taking tllc
Jefferson’s original plan of 1784 contemplated survey ahead of
settlement, in a grid pattern based on “hundreds” of 10 nautical miles
square. As adopted m 1785, this plan was modified to provide for townships
six miles square, based on the English statute mile. The early intent was
that only townships would be marked in the original survey, leaving to
settlement companies the task of marking out the separate square miles or
sections, and smaller subdivisions.
This system failed, or more exactly, it was never implemented. Pressure
from squatter settlers led to a law in 1800 requiring the sale and hence the
survey of public lands in half-sections; in 1805 a land law required sub-
division into quarter-sections of 160 acres, and this was later reduced to
80-acre tracts in 1820 and to quarter-quarter sections or 40-acre tracts in
1832. The major settlement of the Mississippi valley and the western lands
was thus accomplished under land laws that authorized the survey, at public
expense, of units as small as 40 acres. This became the conventional trans-
action unit.
The primary condition for an efficient market m land was created
early In our settlement history. The product
and title was easily and cheaply recorded and
doubt the single most important act of public
was specified, it was divisible,
transferred. This was without
policy that promoted speedy3
settlement . A foundation was laid for early land-based credit, supported
with secure titles. A basis was created for the unambiguous specification
of tax obligations , which facilitated the financing of public roads and
schools from local revenues. Units of local government could be assembled
in building-block fashion. In older lands and less systematically surveyed
areas, the boundary-line quarrel has been a curse on relations among
neighbors. These quarrels were minimal in the public-domain states.
The forty-acre tract has been a remarkably durable transaction unit.
In most states it was and is the management unit in forestry, and the base
unit m forest taxation. It was the claim-unit in Iron-ore mining In the
Great Lake states, and remained the trading and tax unit when mining shifted
from direct-shipping ores to taconite. It is the base for the determination
of riparian rights or for issuing permits for water withdrawal or irrigation
In a number of states. In more recent years, it has been the building-bloc].
m suburban land sales and housing developments. From Ohio to the Great
Plains the texture of the landscape is dominated by the 40-acre grid.
A secure base for credit, a secure base for taxation, a transaction
unit that was within the financial reach of all but the poorest settlers --
these were the legacies of the publlc land survey. It was the forerunner
of the standardized package that we recognize today as the symbol of the
supermarket.
And a supermarket in land it was. Settlement flowed westward with such
speed that there was no opportunity for local and regional markets to establlsh
and solidzfy positions of trade dominance in farm supplies, consumer goods,
or product markets. The land grants to promote railroad building guaranteed
a dispersal of land-sales efforts as the railroads sought settlement that
would generate the traffic they needed for survival.4
The result was a national market, largely created in the thirty years
following the end of the Civil War. The ready availability of an abundance
of land pulled people across the continent with such speed that business
firms were unable to develop the spatial monopolies in market areas that
were typical of Europe at the onset of the industrial era.
What makes a nation? The traditional answer has been to define it m
political terms. The answer for America is not without a political content
but it is above all an economic answer, defined as a market area. Available
land generated the traffic that supported the transport network that tied
widely scattered regions into a single market. This has surely been one of
the major dimensions of
III.
success in American land policy.
The Resultant Enterprise Mix
The business structure that emerged was geared to the supply of a wide
mixture of both producer and consumer goods. It was balanced in a rough
way, in that it was not focused narrowly on the processing of raw materials,
or on the merchandising of imported goods. It was from the beginning a
structure of manufacturing, processing and trade , with no predominant sector.
Railroad building required the products of heavy industry, while small farms
and small towns provided a market for hardware, building materials, textiles
and the products of light industry.
To understand the significance of this industrial mix it is instructive
to look at the USSR. Heavy industry predominates. There is no ready supply
of small tools. Tractors are available, but nails and wire arc all but
unobtainable. Building materials are scarce, and llght industrial products
In chronic short supply. To take another example, the new-world economies
in Latin America were dominated in their period of early settlement by a5
trading mentality. In broad terms, their business communities were not
production-oriented. Their market areas were the environs of seaboard
cities, with a taste for imported goods. Emerging industrial activity
was focused on raw material processing. The supply of manufactured goods
to internal markets was not rewarding because the size of the market was
small. Venezuela, one of the most Industrialized of Latin American countries
and with the highest per capita income in Latin America, reckoned as late
as the 1950’s that only one-third of its population was included in the
market economy. This situation reflects a failure of land policy, and not
industrial policy. It is this aspect of retarded growth that was avoided
in the United States and major credit goes to the policies by which we
disposed of our abundant land.
IV. The Impact on Labor Markets —— —
The enterprise mix was important in another sense. There was not only
a balance between heavy and light industry, or producer goods and consumer
goods manufacture, there was also a durable balance between agriculture and
industry. The possibllty of land ownership on a wide scale had one over-
whelming advantage: It made agriculture respectable, and above all, in
the eyes of agriculturalists. Farming as an occupation was not demeaning.
One result was that the food supply kept pace with urban and industrial
growth. A rough balance was maintained between the technology that released
labor from farming and the technology that provided alternative non-farm jobs.
When industrialization dld begin in earnest, It did so without the
debilitating influence of an agricultural labor surplus. In a relevent
intercontinental sense, labor never was cheap in America. As one British
industrialist remarked at the end of the Nineteenth Century, when speaking6
of Britain, “men have been cheaper than machines. Today ... men are getting
dear and machines are getting cheap. The whip of dear labour was applied
,,1/
to the backs of American manufacturers years ago. –
The impact of an abundance of land was great on labor markets, as
well as on the markets for goods
raphy, this impact has typically
theory that traces from the work
and commodities. In American historlog-
been analyzed in terms of the safety-valve
of Frederick Jackson Turner. According to
that theory, the agrarian frontier maintained relatively high industrial
wage levels by providing a safety valve where protest and discontent could
be vented, and where surplus labor could be drained off from any Eastern
markets that showed evidences of labor redundancy.
It is my view that this interpretation of our land settlement history
has been inverted. It was not as safety valve but as stockpile that the
continental population of small farms had its greatest impact on labor
markets. The abundance of land held labor on the farms until it was needed
in industry. The truly remarkable feature of the American transition to an
~ndustrlal state was not that labor could not be kept on the farm. It was
rather that labor stayed on the farm as long into the Industrial era as it
did. The really massive exodus of labor from U.S. agriculture occurred
after 1950. There was never a wave of dispossessed or redundant rural labor
In America to compare with that experienced in Scotland, Ireland or the
English midlands in the early decades of the industrial revolution.
Widespread land ownership led not only to rapid settlement but it raised
the opportunity wage rate that farmers had to be offered before they would
~1
Andrew Shonfeld, “A Question of Upbringing”, The Observer (London),
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leave farming. The full impact of the abundance of land on labor markets
in the U.S. came in the twentieth century. It involved agriculture’s
ability to hold management and labor in farming after 1870 at a stage of
industrial development when expanding non-farm employment opportunities
might have impaired our ability to develop agriculture to its full capacity.
The peak labor input into American agriculture occurred in the early 1920’s.
It was 24 billion man-hours in 1920. In 1975 it was one-fifth of the 1920
level, and 80 percent of the decline had occurred after 1944.
When the exodus of farm labor did occur, it involved a significant
proportion of workers who were familiar with machinery, were oriented to a
commercial mode of life, and possessed a work ethic that made them valuable
additions to the industrial labor force. This was a major legacy of our
land pollcies and settlement history.
v. Dimensions of —
We dld not avoid jealousy
EQ9.!E!2.?S 2.SW!ES!22
or envy in our internal development because
of our abundance of land, but these traits did not dominate political
Ideologies. Those whose lives were touched most directly by this abundance
were singularly free of any consciousness of class, in its European or
Marxist dimensions. Their political reactions were often erratic and some-
times violent, but they were dedicated to making the system work, seldom
to its destruction. Up to this generation, the radical tradition in
American agriculture has combined protest with property.
There was a large measure of horizontal equity at the frontier of dgrl-
cultural settlement. People with similar abilities could be seen to have
roughly comparable opportunities. The rigors of frontier life and the common-
ality of tasks in an economy of survival led to an avoidance of that most8
corrosive aspt’ct of inequality -- tll(~ unequal trt!atment of ~~quals,wll~$tl}~’r
measured in terms of age, education, skill, or dedication of purpose. This
existence of a rough measure of economic justice in terms of horizontal
equity was a base that could support a substantial degree of tolerance for
extreme violations in vertical equity, or the gap between the incomes of
the rich and the poor.
A European visitor to America once remarked that his first reactions
(male, of course) were that our young girls looked so mature and our old
women looked so young. If he had looked more closely at the fabirc of
rural society in the Midwest and West, he might have added that the poor
behaved as if they were going to be rich , and the rich embraced their wealth
with the ardor and abandon of a sailor with a Saturday night pass. There
were no great and durable land-based fortunes in America created out of
agricultural land. In this dimension the U.S. joins Canada, Norway, Finland
and Switzerland as the only presently developed countries to enter the
industrial era free of the burden of an agrarian aristocracy with a dispro-
portionate capacity to create new wealth, or to dissipate it.
An optimum condition for capital formation was generated. In an agrarian
society characterized by large land holdings it is often not true that savings
equal investment. If by savings we mean “a surplus”, then in some cultures
and societies that surplus has entered the consumption stream and has not
supported new capital. “Savings equal consumption” would be a more descriptive
equation to use in analyzing the ante-bellum American South, the export-
oriented agrarian societies of Latin America, or some of today’s newly inde-
pendent nations.
A legacy of the presence of an abundance of land was that It fostered
horizontal equity on a scale that reduced the sting of vertical inequity. It9
created political tolerance for the disparity in income distribution that
is an essential part of the process of rapid capital formation m any
economic system. The task of creating farms out of this abundance of land
demonstrated the purposes of investment and formation of capital in terms
that were understood at all income levels. A cynic might conclude that it
kept the natives quiet while the economic chieftans extracted a surplus for
capital investment. A more perceptive interpretation is to point out that
our abundance of land was no bundle of bones thrown to yelping dogs to keep
them quiet, but an exercise in do-it-yourself capital formation that was
educational in the most profound sense of that term.
VI. The Rewards of a Capacity to Fail .— —. ——
One aspect of this abundance of land gives rise to a seeming paradox.
The widespread availability
that sought to increase the
based on human intellectual
of land generated the evolution of a system
supply of land through productivity increases
achievement. This was a response to a challenge
but it should not be interpreted as confirmation of the aphorism that neces-
sity IS the mother of invention. There IS a very poor correlation between
the truly necessitous and Intellectual achievements
of human labor.
The very abundance of space, and the challenge
who would convert it to agricultural use, created a
that stimulated innovation, creative adaptation and
that enhance the value
it presented to those
structure of rewards
continuing experimentation.
It provided the “soft landing” m case of failure that was sufficient to
stimulate risk-taking on the scale required.
A distinguishing feature of the history of American land settlement
1s that for three hundred years ending about 1930 the abundance of the land10
base reduced the cost of failure. Not the risk of failure, which was great,
but its cost in real terms. If you went broke, you could go somewhere else
and start over. If you went far enough West, there were valleys that were
gardens. The response to failure was to push on, as well as to turn back.
This led to a gigantic system of experimentation in farm development that
enables us to describe the settlement history of America as a system of
replicated test plots on a continental scale. The Land Grant Colleges
and the Agricultural Experiment Stations, of which we sing so proudly, are
an institutionalized and systematized version of a process that speeds con-
structive learning by a system of controlled failures. In the history of
land settlement failure was not new. What was new was an abundance of land
that permitted application of the lessons learned from failure w~thin a
single human lifespan. Those who experimented could fail, and survive to
try again.
The land was often abused in the process. In the transitional zone
between the humid mid-West and the Great Plain% two generations were required
to unlearn the folk-ways of a European agricultural heritage that was unsuited
to a semi-arid region. The resultant dust-storms of the 1930’s are a blot
on the pages of our agricultural history.
In the Lake States , and later in the far West, timber-harvesting was
wasteful, much land was cleared that should have remained in forests, and
the ecologic damage took at least a half-century to repair.
In historical perspective, the damage diminishes m importance. The
destruction of a stock of capital is not necessarily bad. The crucial deter-
minant is not that the forests were cut. The key question is: What was done
with the capital thus created? In the case of timber, enormous amounts of
capital were created quickly. Railroads were built, homes and farms constructed,11
towns sprang up. In continental terms the timber was not wasted. The
continent was settled, the investment in buildings required for the
transition from crop farming to animal agriculture was made possible, and
a national market was created. These are no minor achievements. In retro-
spect, we can condemn the heedless abandon with which they were executed.
The cost was great, but the benefits were even greater.
VII. International Impacts of an Abundance of Land .— ——
We have dealt to this point with the domestic consequences of abundant
land but this leaves an Important part of the story untold. The international
dimension is not less important and its impact was not fully manifest until
after the Second World War. It began a century ago, with an influx of cheap
grain into Europe following the railroad building era that resumed in the
United States at the end of the Civil War. Agricultural policies in England,,
Sweden, Denmark, Germany and France after about 1870 were to a major degree
a reaction to the shifting ratio of prices between imported and domestic
grains. In England and in Denmark this shift reinforced a movement toward
free trade. In Sweden, Germany and France it strengthened the arguments of
those who urged protectionist policies. After 1880, the additional appearance
of cheap grain from Australia and Russia on the European market provided the
clinching argument in France for adoption of the M~line tariff in 1892,
setting France irreversibly on a protectionist course that persists to the
present day.
After 1945, cheap North American grain had an unanticipated impact on
the industrial development of Germany and Japan. Wikh their protectionist
policies destroyed by defeat in war, the plentiful supply of U.S. and Canadian
gram and U.S. soybeans gave Germany and Japan the assured food supply needed
to underwrite their rapid postwar recovery.12
Since the dawn of the industrial era the key to rapid industrial
advance has been the availability of a relatively cheap food supply. Until
the 1950’s this was obtained by Great Britain from North America and the
colonles, and by France from Africa. The absence of comparable sources
provided Hitler with supporting arguments for his push to the East, and
Japan with incentives for its military and economic penetration In Manchuria,
Korea, and Taiwan. It is ironic that defeat in war was the key to alter-
native supplles, underwritten by the abundance and productivity of North
American land.
The dramatic grain imports by the Soviet Union since 1972 provide
dec~s~ve evidence of the importance of food in industrial development strategy.
The division of labor among the developed countries of the world has been
dominated to the present day by the availability of North American food sur-
pluses. The “soft landing” in case of failure that abundant land provided
pioneering American farmers in the Nineteenth Century has been extended in
the past three decades to cover the entire tradzng world. Not the least of
this world’s worries today is provided by the nagging question: Has the
valldity of this insurance policy expired? From whence will come the cheap
food to underwrite the development of the




Threats to the continued availability of an agricultural surplus In
the United States do not arise from any likely deterioration In land quallty
or productivity. Neither IS there a threat from the rapid expansion of our
cities, if measured on a continental scale
a threat to speclflc types of agricultural
urban growth in areas with unique soil and
and in acres only. But there 1s
land use, posed by Unconstrdlned
climatic endowments. The Paclflc13
Coast states and Hawaii provide extreme examples of the near-irreversible
loss of lands of this quality.
On a larger scale, it is increasingly difficult to make a functional
distinction between urban and rural land uses in the midwest heartland of
American agriculture. In the urban-industrial area traced by an arc that
envelopes Duluth, Omaha, Kansas City, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh
the farm and the city interact with each other so powerfully that it must
be treated as one large urban impact area. The nature of this impact has
changed dramatically in the last three decades.
The most powerful change agent has been the Interstate highway system.
The funds to finance this system come primarily from taxes on motor fuel
and tires. The revenue is a function of distance traveled. We spend the
proceeds to link cities, and increasingly to save travel time and relieve
congestion around cities. With distance only in the revenue function and
distance plus time in the expenditure function, we have created a money-
pump. The effect has been to generate windfall capital gains for landowners
at the urban fringe, and to subsidize the suburbs.
Unrestricted urban sprawl has been subsidized in other ways as well.
Housing finance has favored the single-family detached house. Income tax
policy has discriminated against high-density rental housing by generous
allowances for deductibility of property taxes and interest on borrowed
money. Lower interest rates for the finance of public facilities have been
available through tax-exempt municipal bonds to the municipalities tha~
would bond themselves. These are clustered disproportionately m the suburbs.
By using average-cost instead of marginal-cost pricing for the extension of
publlc utilities, rate-payers in established urban areas are forced to sub-
sidize new high-cost hook-ups at the urban fringe.14
In these and other less obvious ways we have encouraged a lavlsh
use of urban land, by subsidizing a demand for space. The abundance of
our land base has fostered an illusion that we can ignore urban encroach-
ments on agricultural land.
The test of this encroachment is not properly measured in acres. The
decisive impact is not in terms of acres lost to farming but rather in terms
of the growing urban dominance in decisions regarding land use. The zone
of urban disturbance in agriculture is many times greater than the zone of
urban occupancy of the land. It is this confllct between incompatible
land uses that creates the most urgent demand for reformed land policies m
years ahead.
Ix. The Threat of Alienation .— —
If we look forward to the year 2000, which I remind you involves the
foresight that would have been required in 1950 to anticipate the world
of 1975, we can suggest some probable conflicts that will reform our attitudes
toward land. One possibility is that American agriculture m the final
quarter of the 20th Century WI1l present us with a sharp confrontation between
the goals of full employment and efficiency in resource use. It IS customary
to present major policy choices as conflicts between efficiency and equity.
This is the language in which the conflict between labor and capital IS
often couched. The more reallstic confrontation may emerge between the goals
of full employment and efficiency. Historically, the substitution of capital
for labor and the retirement of Jobs requiring manual labor has been one of
the most prominent features of U.S. agriculture. Substitution of this type
has been the goal of most of our farm technology and much of our agricultural
research. At the same time, we have elevated full employment to the status15
of a sacred goal. In all walks of life, In all social strata, in .Ill(Jthnlc
and religious groups, there is agreement that full employment is a proper
goal.
There 1s a fundamental conflict between the goals of destroying jobs
in agriculture and Implementing full employment. This is a confrontation
that cuts through the whole economy. It is not confined to agriculture,
but it may be more prominent in agriculture because the reversal may be more
dramatic if It comes. I represent an agricultural experiment station and
a profession of agricultural economists whose focus has been almost exclusively
on the reduction of labor inputs in farming. We have not questioned the
rightness of the goal of destroying gobs in farming as a measure of progress.
We have now reached a stage in our history when we have to face the
fact that a job in agriculture is in no sense inferior. Value added per worker
in agriculture 1s higher than in many non-farm occupations. The social at-
tributes of agricultural employment compare favorably with almost all other
occupations. It is possible to stockpile the temporarily unemployed or
the under-employed in agriculture at lower social and economic cost than in
almost any other sector of the economy. In these and many other ways we
have reason to reexamine the assumption that It is good to destroy Jobs In
agriculture. An employment policy that is more even-handed than has been
the case In the past seems to be one of the requirements for the next 25 years.
This could be associated with a rediscovery of an old truth In a new
garment. It has been customary in rural circles, and sometimes politically
rewarding, to talk about the preservation of the family farm. A new termi-
nology is needed. We need to discover the fact that the classic example of
the worker-managed firm In an industrial society has been the American family
farm. One of the great policy problems facing industry is to devise effective16
plans to permit workers to share in management decisions. We already
have that structure in agriculture and we may be about to lose it.
The structural renovation of agriculture should be freed from the
dead-weight baggage represented by an emotional attachment to a 19th
Century concept of the family farm. It should be enlivened by a realization
that this is the original, most successful form of worker-management in
Industry that we know. We have not had to struggle with problems of anomie
and worker alienation m agriculture. We have had other problems, but
alienation has generally not been characteristic of farming. It could arise.
Hired farm labor has been increasing as a fraction of total labor inputs
in agriculture for more than twenty years. As we turn from family labor to
hired labor we can expect agriculture to face the same problem that industry
now faces: How to relate the well being of the worker and the well being
of the firm in a functional fashion that will enable workers to feel that
they are a part of the firm, even though they have been divorced from owner-
ship of the capital and tools with which they work.
x. The Threat of Bureaucratized Senescence —— .
There is an off-farm dimension of problems of size and scale that WI1l
also become important in the next quarter century. Farm cooperatives have
reflected the structure of the agricultural industry in which there were
many small, worker-managed firms. They could join together in some form
and support cooperatives, non-governmental local farm organizations, and a
w~de variety of professional and para-political associations. A significant
amount of capital could be mobilized by relatively small fees and dues, or
small withholdings and retentions from the marketing stream. It was realistlc
to say that these firms and these organizations were owned or controlled by17
their members. We now have organizations in the service of supply to
agriculture, in the marketing of agricultural products, and in the
professional representation of agriculture that are nominally owned or
controlled by their members but that in fact are not. The possibility
of alienation in the marketing system or in the professional organizations
serving agriculture is at least as great as it is in the work place on
the farm. A number of firms and organizations are now so large, so remote
and so bureaucratized that it is very difficult for the individual to
Identify with them , whether they be a private firm, or a cooperative. They
share in common the problems of remoteness, an information flow that is
hierarchical in nature, loss of quality in information, and ordinary
bureaucratic lag that prevents optimum decision making. We have never
had to reckon in American agriculture with the possibility that it would
exhibit the senescence associated with the railroads, the steel industry,
or more recently, the automobile business. We now must reckon with this
propsect.
A large population of small firms and the fact that they could fail
at low social costs meant that there was a continued process of sifting,
winnowing and weeding out in agriculture. The fewer the firms, the less
efficient is this weeding out process, and the greater the opportunity for
bureaucratized management to entrench itself in power. This has been
characteristic of every large organizational structure, and it could happen
m agriculture. This was never a possibility before.
The first signs of this bureaucratic rigidity are already apparent.
We have a dairy marketing cooperative in mid-America today that attempted
to buy a milk-price increase with political contributions. The annual





denounced the managcrncnt. No one rose up on tlw flc>or
call management to account. This exhibits the classic
inability of large professional organizations to purge themselves. The ir
capacity for internal censure is weak, whether they are doctors, lawyers,
accountants or, we must now regretfully add, farm cooperatives. This is new
in the history of American agriculture. Farming has been the text-book
example of atomistic competition. We must now face a future in which the
size of firms and
culture invite an
One reaction
potentials for monopoly power in some dimensions of agri-
application of the Anti-Trust laws.
XI. Do We Need A Land Ethic? —— —- ——
to the destructive creativity of our period of rapid
settlement has been to point to the need for a land ethic. In a widely
quoted study, Fred Bosselman and David Callies stress the recent change
2/
in emphasis from land as a commodity to land as a resource.- It is both,
as they rightly point out. But this play on words obscures more than it
reveals. The implication is apparently that land as a resource should not
be traded, or dealt with in the market place. This seems to be the only
interpretation that gives sense to the distinction.
It is more appropriate to turn the argument around. There is evidence
from our courts, our legislatures , and our credit system that land has not
been treated as just another commodity. It has not been regulated in inter-
state commerce until quite recently. Transactions in land are not subject
to review by price-setting and rate-making bodies, as are the prices of
2/ -,
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Council on Environmental Quality, =hington, D.C., 1971, p. 315.
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other commodities that have a high component of public utility. It has
not been possible to transfer use rights or ownership rights in land with
the same freedom and efficiency that is possible with other tangible
evidences of wealth.
Many cultures have sanctified land. Even in nominally monotheistic
cultures it has often contributed an element of pantheism that in an
extreme form can legitimately be called land worship. The remarkable feature
of the settlement history of North America is that this land worship was
constrained. Land was desired, but it was not sanctified. Instead of
arguing for an ethic that would freeze land into uses deemed appropriate
by this generation, it is more persuasive to argue that land should be
treated more like a commodity, not less. It should be subject to the entire
range of regulations , controls, review, and specification that are required
3/
in a market economy for the efficient functioning of markets.-
It is not that we lack a land ethic. It is rather that we have not
divested ourselves of a now outmoded land ethic. Our Anglo-Saxon attitudes
and land laws evolved to protect land users when there were no stable govern-
ments, no accessible systems of Justice, inadequate modes of transport and
marketing, and no functional systems of welfare other than the one provided
by land ownership.
Nazi Germany had a land ethic. Marxism provides a variation that is
less racist but no less rigid. Tribal societies are retarded by land ethics
that are major barriers to the recognition of their human potential. What
we now need to do is to demythologize land. The call for a land ethic is a
call for worship at the feet of a false god.
II
This point of view is persuasively argued by Richard F. Babcock, “On Land-
Use Policy”, Planning, The ASPO Magazine, June 1975, pp. 12-18.20
XII. The True Measure of Resource Abundance .— — —
Surrounded by a world of science, we seem to be increasingly the
victims of reasoning based on symbols. Surely one of the least helpful
of these symbols has been the notion of “spaceship earth”. The implication
is one of totality, finiteness, and limits. In interpreting the symbol,
we have forgotten Howard Odum’s warning that we cannot separate the con-
ceptual quartet of man and land, time and space.
We cannqt define qpace without a concept of time. We cannot define
land independently of man. In appraising our resource base, we are dealing
with economic variables. There is no resource until one is recognized by
man. Its quantity cannot be measured, except in terms of the use to which
it is put. These uses, in turn, are a function of possibilities of sub-
stitution, rates of recovery, costs of transport , efficiency in conversion,
and consumer tastes. These change, and the available stock of resources
changes with them.
A stock of resources is thus not a physical quantity. The stock is
created by ma% in that it cannot be said to exist in economic terms until
he can use it. We are unable to define a stock or supply of resources,
except in terms of man’s intelligence and skill. This intelligence and
these skills are not finite. And therefore our stock of resources is not
finite. A resource, in this view, is a cultural achievement, a unit of
thought. The key is the potential for substitution.
It is in this sense that the concept of “spaceship earth” has had a
perverse Influence. It has hardened the idea that we live on a finite
planet, and are in danger of exhausting its resources.
From this finite assumption we derive many of our basic philosophical
and religious precepts. It is the basis for the concept of llmited good,21
on which so much of current political policy is based. If you get more,
then I must be satisfied with less. If I am to prosper, I must do so
at the expense of someone else. If the developing nations are to over-
come their poverty, the developed nations must consume less. If there are
to be resources for our grandchildren, we must cut back on our rate of
use in this generation. As a policy for survival, we must stop growth,
and strive for a stable state. We are victims of the “end of the frontier”
psychosis. Our abundance of land has betrayed us.
But there is a sense in which our stock of resources is limited. We
can put a stop to intellectual growth. We can reach levels of over-population
that destroy social and political organization. We can have levels of con-
gestion and overcrowding that cause us to !tbiteeach others tails”~ as pigs
do in close confinement.
In these ways we can limit or destroy our stock of resources. The
surest way to do this is to destroy intellectual freedom in our universities
and schools. This is where resources are created. And this is why the
ultimate measure of our stock of resources for the future is to be found
in our cultural commitment, in our social stability, and in our ability
to live at peace with our fellow men.
It is a tragic betrayal of our inheritance to mistake the thing for
the substance. What should we preserve but the spirit? This is the lesson
taught us by our abundance of land.